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A NEW PHASE OF THE ANTITRUST LAW
Robert W. Harbeson*

T

HE divergence between the economic and legal concepts of monopoly and the consequences thereof have been emphasized by
various writers in recent years.1 Monopoly in economics means control of the market; that is, the ability of a seller by increasing or decreasing his output to affect the price of the product sold. Moreover,
monopoly is recognized as being a matter of degree, depending upon
the number of buyers and sellers of a commodity and the availability
of adequate substitutes, ranging from pure monopoly through duopoly,
oligopoly and monopolistic competition. By contrast, as Professor
Mason has pointed out, "The term monopoly as used in the law is
not a tool of analysis but a standard of evaluation," by means of which
public policy with respect to certain business practices might be developed. 2 In law monopoly has largely meant the suppression of the
freedom of an individual or firm to compete, by legal restraint, by
agreement among competitors or by predatory tactics of rivals.
Probably the most important, though by no means the only, reason
for the adoption of this definition of monopoly has been that courts
must have available tests capable of distinguishing between situations
which are and are not in the public interest, and the tests of conformity
to public interest under the foregoing definition of monopoly are relatively simple. By contrast, if the economic definition of monopoly as
control of the market were adopted and used as a standard of evaluation, there would be involved a complicated analysis of such factors as
the behavior of prices and outputs, the relation of prices and costs, the
share of the market controlled, the existence of such practices as price
discrimination, and many others--a task which the courts would obviously' be ill-equipped to undertake.
·
One outstanding consequence of the legal concept of monopoly has
been that huge enterprises exercising important monopolistic influence

* Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois; formerly Principal Economist, lnterstat~ Commerce Commission. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the writer and should not be construed as reflecting the views of any government
agency.
1
For example, Mason, "Monopoly in Law and Economics," 47 YALE L. J. 34
(1937); Harbeson, "The Present Status of the Sherman Act," 39 MICH. L. REv.
189 (1940); PURDY, LINDAHL and CARTER, CoRPORATE CoNCENTRATION AND Pu:s-LIC POLICY ( 1942).
2
Mason, id. at 34.
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have been permitted to stand,8 the only exceptions being in certain
cases dealing with railroads, or with railroads and their anthracite coal
affiliates.4 Apart from the latter group of cases the rule of reason has
been largely limited to distinguishing between mergers which are and
those which are not guilty of predatory tactics. 5
The legal view of monopoly is epitomized in certain well-known
. data in the United States Steel Corporation case in 1920, in which it
was held that the corporation was not a monopoly within the meaning
of the Sherman Act, primarily on the ground that it was not at the time
3
,
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 S. Ct. 253 (1913); United States
v. United Shoe Mchy. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S. Ct. 473 (1918); United States T.
United States Steel Corp., 25 I U.S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293 (1920); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 47 S. Ct. 748 (1927).
4
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436 (1904);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 32 S. Ct. 507
(1912); United States 'v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 53 (1912);
United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 33 S. Ct. 90 (1912); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 40 S. Ct: 425 (1920); United States v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co., 2.54 U.S. 255, 40 S. Ct. 104 (1920); United States v. Southern Pacific
Co., 259 U.S. 214, 42 S. Ct. 496 (1922).
.
5
In the common law the term restraint of trade originally referred to restrictive
covenants which were ancillary to some larger transaction, such as, for example, the
agreement of the seller of a bu~iness as part of his contract of sale not to compete with
his purchaser. These contracts' were at first held void and u_nenforceable, but at an
early date a rule of reason was developed whereby such contracts might be held valid
under certain conditions. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(17II). In early cases under the Sherman Act the Supreme Court held that apart
from such ancillary restraints every combination or agreement in restraint of trade,
however reasonable or beneficial, was unlawful, and that any exceptions to the sweeping prohibitions of the Sherman Act would have to be made by Congress. United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, ~7 S. Ct. 540 (1897); United States
v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25 (1898); Addyston Pipe and Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 2II, 20 S. Ct. 96 (1899). However, by 19II the view
of the majority had changed. Chief Justice White, handing down the majority opinion
in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, held that only unreasonable restraints
of trade were prohibited. According to his view, a reasonable restriction of competition
was not a restraint of trade at all and the test of reasonableness should be applied to nonancillary combinations of, and agreements between, competitors just as it had been
applied earlier to ancillary restraints. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (19l'I); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632 (19II). Although only a dictum, since the Court coul~
scarcely avoid finding these companies to be unlawful combinations in restraint of trade
under any interpretation of the law, this so-called rule of reason became a basic feature
of subsequent'antitrust law interpretation. As pointed out above, the test of reasonableness, with some exceptions, has been primarily whether or not there is suppression of
freedom to compete, as evidenced by agreements between, or by predatory tactics
toward, competitors. This doctrine has been of considerable importance in protecting
mergers and large-scale enterprises from dissolution under the Sherman Act but has
had relatively little effect of this sort in the case of loose federations of competitors.

•
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of the suit guilty of predatory ta~tics toward competitors, and that
"the law· does not make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence." 6 With regard to the evidence of price leadership presented in the case, the Court ans,vered that "The suggestion
that lurks in the Government's contention that the acceptance of the
Corporation's prices is the submission of impotence to irresistible power
is;in view of the testimony of competitors, untenable. They, as we have
seen, deny restraint in any measure or illegal influence of any kind." 1
The significance of price rigidity was dismissed with the comment that
"there is danger of deception in generalities." 8 Similar dicta appear in
the International Harvester case.9
On the other hand, the same definition of monopoly which has led
to the foregoing treatment of mergers and large scale enterprise has
resulted in the invalidation of many trade association and other collective activities, some of which imposed much weaker restraints on competition, since under the legal definition of monopoly all contracts or
agreements among competitors to limit competition would prima f acie
constitute restraint of trade.10 The rule of reason has had a very restricted application in the case of agreements made by loose confederations of competitors.11
In the light of the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act sum6
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 at 451, 40 S. Ct. 293
(1920).
1
Id. at 449-450.
8
Id. at 448.
0
- United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 47 S. Ct. 748
(r927). For an opposite viewpoint see Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 59 S. Ct. 467 (19j9).
10
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540
(1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25 {1898);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 2II, 20 S. Ct. 96 {1899);
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S. Ct. 9 (1912);
American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S. Ct. II4
(1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 43 S. Ct. 607
(1923); United Statesv. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927);
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 (1936); United States
T. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct; 8II (1940); United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 S. Ct. 1088 (1942); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S. Ct. 1070 (1942).
11
Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S. Ct.
242 (1918); National Assn. of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403,
44 S. Ct. 148 (1923); Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass1,1. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
45 S. Ct. 578, 592 (1925); Cement Mfrs.' Protective Assn. v. United States, 268
U.S. 588, 45 S. Ct. 586, 592 (1925); Standard Oil Co. {Ind.) v. United States, 283
U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421 (1931); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933). See also note 5, supra.
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marized above considerable significance attaches to the decision of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York in United States v.
Aluminum Company of America,12 handed down on March 12, 1945,
and the decision of the U.!lited States Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,18 handed down on June IO, 1946. In the
Aluminum case the three senior judges of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down the final decision as provided by statute14 after
the Supreme Court was unable to muster the necessary quorum of six
justices qualified to hear the case upon direct appeal from the district
court. It was held that the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)
had a monopoly of the domestic ingot market within the meaning of
the Sherman Act, even though the company was not at the time of the
suit guilty of predatory tactics as that term is ordinarily understood,
and that Aluminium Limited of Canada, controlled by the same interests, violated the prohibition against restraint of trade by entering into
a cartel agreement with foreign producers in 1936. In the Tobacco
case the three leading companies, American Tobacco, Liggett and Myers, and R. J. Reynolds, were held guilty of conspiracy to monopolize
because of a finding of power and intent to exclude competition to a
substantial extent in the tobacco industry, even though there was no
actual exclusion of competitors. The Court quoted the decision in the
Aluminum case at length and with complete approval.
The importance of these two decisions lies not so much in their
sharp modification of the rule of reason as in the fact that they represent a significant step by the federal courts toward making market control the test of monopoly and thus toward assimilating the legal
concept of monopoly to the economic. Although the decisions are not
clear-cut on all points and leav~ some unanswered questions, taken together they represent a very considerable departure from the position
announced in the Steel and Haruester cases. As the magazine Fortune
puts it, referring to the Aluminum case, "The Attorney General had
finally succeeded in establishing, beyond appeal, that a monopoly is a
monopoly--even under the Sherman Act." 15
11;1 order to evaluate the Court's decision in the Alcoa case a brief
description of the economic organization of the aluminum industry is
desirable. The predominant position of Alcoa just prior to World
War II is revealed in Table I. The extent of the company's control,
12

148 F. (2d) 416 (1945).
328 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct. II25 (1946).
14
15 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1941-1·946) §29.
15
"Aluminum Reborn," 33 FoRTUNE 103 (May, 1946).
18
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over domestic bauxite resources is disputed, the government claiming
that the company controls 90 per cent of the known reserves while the
company contends that the percentage is nearer half that figure. The
reason for this variation in estimates is that bauxite ores are widely
scattered and are of such widely varying quality that it is difficult to
determine the extent of the commercially available supply. There can
TABLE I
Approximate Prewar Competition in the Aluminum Industry
in the United States a.

Product

Number of
producers,
including Alcoa

Primary aluminum. . . . . . .
I
Alumina (for aluminum)b.
I
Sheet...................
7
Foil. ............. ·. . . . . .
5 to Io
Structural shapes (large). .
I
Extrusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Cable...................
I
Cooking utensils ......... Approximately 30
Castings ............... .

.-

Alcoa's percentage of
production
Per cent Years included
IOO
IOO

Over 82
66-44
IOO

84
IOO

50

1 5-25

Up to 1940
Up to 1940
1939
1933-39
1930-37
1934-38
1934-38
1934-37
1934-38

a. Source: ALUMINUM PLANTS AND FACILITIES. Report of the Surplus Property
Board to the Congress, Sept. 21, 1945, p. 20.
b A number of chemical companies produced alumina for chemical uses or for conversion into other chemical products. Their total production, however, was probably less
than 5 per cent of Alcoa's.
0 A number of medium and large producers and many small foundries engaged in
nonferrous metal casting.

be little doubt, however, that the company has a strangle hold on the
domestic bauxite resour'ces. In addition Alcoa acquired important bauxite reserves in foreign countries, most of which were transferred in
r928 to Aluminium Limited of Canada, which is controlled by the
same interests as control Alcoa.
..
During the five years ending in r944 Alcoa added $252,000,000
to its net investment,16 while during the ·same period the government
inv~ted a total of $738,732,000 in aluminum plants and facilities. 11
At the peak of the war effort Alcoa operated government facilities representing an investment of $500,000,000, including all but one of the
16
ALUMINUM PLANTS AND FACILITIES, Report of the Surplus Property Board to
the Congress, Sept. 21, 1945, p. 21.

11

Id., P·

IO.
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aluminum ingot plants and a large share of the fabrication plants. For
the first time in fifty years Alcoa was obliged to share the ingot market
with domestic rivals. The Reynolds Metals Company began producing
aluminum in May, r94r and the Olin ColJ)oration in September, r942,
although the latter closed down after V-J day. That Alcoa retained
overwhelming dominance, however, is indicated by the data in Table 2,
but· it should be added that since October 3r, r945, when its leases
were termin~ted, Alcoa has discontinued as rapidly as possible operation of the government-owned facilities built during the war. Alcoa's
dominant position internationally is indicated by the fact that in r 944
it owned or- operated 3 8 per cent of the world aluminum ingot capacity
and the affiliated Aluminium Limited an additional 26 per cent. 18 The
latter company is the world's largest producer of ingot. Its plant at
Arvida, Quebec, secures electric power from the famous Shipshaw hydroelectric development and is reputed to be the world's lowest cost
ingot plant.
·
On April 23, r937, the Depa~ent of Justice brought suit against
Alcoa in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York, seeking not merely good behavior on the part of Alcoa but a
reorganization of the company which would end its monopoly position.
After some preliminary litigation to settle the question of jurisdiction,19
the trial was begun on June r, r938. The record included 40,000 pages
of testimony and ro,ooo pages of exhibits and required 3 62 trial days
to P.resent. Judge Francis G. Caffey,. in a long opinion delivered over
the period September 30 through Octob'er ro, r94r, overruled the
government on all points, basing his decision on the precedent of the
Steel Corporation and International Haruester cases. 20 The divergence
between the legal and economic concepts of monopoly is well illustrated by the following excerpt from Judge Ca:ffey's opinion:
"On principj.e it seems to me that it would be little short of
absurd to construe Section 2 [ of the Sherman Act] without quali-'fication to mean that production of the entire output in the United
States of a particular article, or of any article, or that the possession or sale of it by the producer, without other complaint or criticism of -his conduct, would constjtute monopolization of the article." 21
1s Id.,

p: 90.

19

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. Pa. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 374,
20 F. Supp. 608; Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U.S. 230, 58 S. Ct.

178 (1937),
20

.

.

I

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1941) ,t.4 F. Supp. 97.
21 Id. at 154.
·

•

Percent of total capacity of industry

Branch of the industry

Alumina ......................
Ingot .........................
Sheet •........................
Rolled rod and bar .............
Forgings:
Heavy hammer ..............
Light hammer and pressings ...
Extrusions:
•
Shapes .....................
Tube blooms ................
Rod and bar ................
Tubing .......................
Wire .........................
Cable ........................
Castings:
.
Sand (includinf cylinder heads)
Permanent mod .............
Die:
Cold-chamber .............
Gooseneck ..... : ........ , .
Foil. ........... : .............
Rolled structural shapes ........
Powder .......................
Paste and flake ................
Rivets ........................

Owned by Defense
Plant Corporation

Privately owned

Total
capacitp
(millions
of pounds)

Alcoa

Reynolds

4,895
1,882b
1,6o4
812

44
•. 47
50
53

4

248
4o5

33
24

218b
144b
89
82b
47
25

53
58
16
63
95
80

.

514b
168

16
21

105
39
56
27
167
12
31

4
28
32
100
·7
50
27

*3
32
I
50
-

12
50
a

Number of
private
producers•

Others

Operated
by Alcoa

Operated
by others

3
-

52
42
36
37

-

2
5
7

2
3
7
2

8
38

27
18

32
20

4
32

3

IS
19

29
12
39
3

4
7
·7
8
4
2

35
5

132
63

II

13
15
4
20

39
74
96
72
18

21
-

48e

-

19

-

-

14

-

-

-

-

46

-

25

...
'°-!>'1

,__,

~

....~
~
q

• tn
~

~

74

si
l

9

2
21

8
Source: Fifth Report of the Attorney General, A Survey Entitled "The Aluminum Industry," S. Doc. No. 94, 79th Cong., 1st sess.
(October u, 1945), Appendices C, D, and E.
• b Excludes Defense Plant Corp. capacity no longer used in the aluminum industry nor maintained in stand-by condition.
0
The same private company is counted in every branch in which it operates its own or Defense Plant Corp. facilities, The actual numher of private companies is, therefore, substantially less than the total of this column.
4 Not reported.
8
Includes capacity of Reynolds Metals Co.

'°w
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As explained at the outset, the United States Supreme Court was
unable to muster the necessary quorum of six justices who could qualify
to hear the case upon appeal by the government, and the three senior
judges of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acted as a court of last
resort. 22 We turn next to an analysis of the circuit court's decision as
contained in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand.
In taking up the question of whether Alcoa violated the Sherman
Act Judge Hand examined the extent of its control over the domestic
market for aluminum ingot. Three alternative measures of the extent
of this control were considered. The first measure was the ratio of Alcoa's production of virgin aluminum ingot to the total quantity of
virgin ingot produced and imported. :Quring the period 1929-38 Alcoa's control on this basis was 90 per cent. The second method was
to subtract from the total amount of virgin ingot produced and imported that part produced by Alco! which was used in its own fabrication plants and which therefore did not enter the market. On this basis
Alcoa's control over the ingot· market was reduced to 64 per cent. The
third method was to exclude the ingot used by Alcoa in its own plants
. and to include as part of the ingot market secondary aluminum ingot
reclaimed from scrap. On this basis Alcoa's control was only 33 per
cent.
District Judge· Caffey held that the third method best measured
the extent of Alcoa's control of the market; Judge Hand, however,
held that the first measure of control was the correct one and his conclusion would seem to rest on a better foundation of economic analysis
than that of Judge Caffey. In support of his conclusion Judge Hand
argued that the ingot produced by Alcoa which was used in its -own
fabrication plants should be included in computing its percentage control of the ingot market because all ingot, with trifling exceptions, is
· used to fabricate intermediate or end profiucts and to the extent that
ingot was used by Alcoa in its own fabrication plants the demand for
ingot by others was reduced with consequent effects on its price. Likewise Judge Hand argued that secondary ingot should be excluded in
computing Alcoa's control of the ingot market because Alcoa's control
over t4e supply of virgin ingot enabled it to control the supply of sec. ondary ingot also; and because it had an inducement to regulate,
· and could regulate, the current supply and price of virgin ingot not
merely by reference to the current market but in anticipation of the
future market and the supply of secondary ingot which would then be
available.
22

See supra, p. 980 and note 14.
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Another consideration in support of Judge Hand's conclusion is
that secondary ingot apparently is not a perfect substitute for virgin
ingot. For some important purposes, such as in cable and airplane
manufacture, it will not be accepted at all, and in other uses it generally, though not always, brings one or two cents per pound less than
virgin ingot. Judge Hand called attention to these factors but did not
consider that they constituted an argument in support of his conclusion.
Paradoxically, it is in connection with the treatment of market
control that the decision achieves its greatest advance over prevailing
legal doctrine and at the same time reveals its greatest limitations. On
the one hand, the Court recognized that, with an exception noted below, "mere size" may be the foundation of monopoly power no less
than predatory tactics. In so doing it took a significant step toward
assimilating the legal concept of monopoly to the economic, and thus
materially alleviated a basic difficulty confronting the effective application of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, the decision suffers
from two serious limitations. First, the degree of control of the ingot
market exercised by Alcoa approximated that of a "pure" monopoly
and the economic issue presented to the Court was therefore relatively
simple and clear-cut. The court did not find it necessary to consider
the problem of lesser degrees of monopoly power, but Judge Hand, in
referring to Alcoa's 90 per cent control of the domestic virgin ingot
market, made the very significant comment that "That percentage
[90] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty
or sixty-four per cent would be enough;· and certainly thirty-three per
cent is not." 28 Thus it would seem that the circuit court was not prepared to go far in making the present decision a precedent for condemning oligopoly and price leadership. It is not unlikely that the
basis of this attitude is the old idea that monopoly and competition are
mutually exclusive and that markets must therefore be either purely
monopolistic or purely competitive, whereas it is now recognized that
monopo~y is a matter of degree and that actually the vast majority of
all markets involve both monopolistic and competitive elements mixed
in varying degrees. However, as will be explained below, the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Tobacco case goes far toward bringing
oligopoly and price leadership within the scope of the Sherman Act.
The other major limitation of the decision is the holding that
under certain circumstances firms may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, even though they are of great size and exercise a high degree
28
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148• F. (2d)
416 at 424.
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of market control. This is the case of firms which do nothing to achieve
monopoly but have monopoly thrust upon them; as Judge Hand put
it, "persons may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to
put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none had existed; they may become monopolists by force of
accident." 24 As illustrations of this situation he mentions the case of a
market so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the
cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole
demand, the case where changes in taste or in cost drive out all but one
purveyor, and the case where there may be a single survivor out of a
group of active competitors merely by virtue, of superior skill, foresight
and industry. He pointed out that it would be unfair and contrary to
the intent of Congress to hold that firms thus situated violated the
Sherman Act, that it was to cover cases of this sort that the courts developed the doctrine that "the law does not make niere size an offense,"
and that the "most extreme expression of this view" was in the Steel
Corporation and International Harvester cases.25
There· is no economic justification for this exception and it can be,
and has been, so li~erally interpreted as to nullify the effectiveness of
the Sherman Act in dealing with close-knit combinations. There is
some reason to believe that Judge Hand recognized these objections
but felt constrained to uphold the exception because of the terms of the
Sherman Act and its legislative history. Thus he said that "although,
the result may expose'the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does
not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its
prime object to foster ...." 2° Furthermore the famous statement in
the Steel Corporation case that "the law does not make mere size an
offense," he dismissed as mere dictum without "the authority of an
actual decision," 21 as having been subsequently modified in United
States v. Swift and Co.,28 and as inapplicable in any event to Alcoa. He
held that a firm violated the Sherman Act if it took active measures to
anticipate and thereby to exclude competition, even though it resorted
to no predatory tactics as that term is commonly understood. The effect
of this holding is materially to restrict the application of the doctrine
\

24

Id. at 429-30~
Id. at 430.
26
Id. at 430.
27 Id. at 430.
28
286 U.S. io6, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932).
25
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of the Steel Corporation and International Harvester cases. The following passages from the decision are significant in this connection:
"We need charge it [Alcoa] with no moral derelictions after
we may assume that all it claims for itself is true. The only
question is whether it falls within the exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the contro~ of a
market. It seems to us that that question scarcely survives its
statement. It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them.
Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity
before others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded
competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and
to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a
great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade
connections and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret
'exclusion' as limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial, but
actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such a
course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' So to
limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; would permi.t
just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent.
"We disregard any question of intent. . . . The plaintifE was
seeking to show that many transactions, neutral on their face, were
not in fact necessary to the development of 'Alcoa's' business, and
had no motive except to exclude others and perpetuate its hold
upon the ingot market. Upon that effort success depended in case
the plaintiff failed to satisfy the court that it was unnecessary under §2 to convict 'Alcoa' of practices unlawful of them~elves. The
plaintiff has so satisfied us, and the issue of intent ceases to have
any importance; .•• In order to fall within §2, the monopolist
must have both the power to monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any 'specific' intent,
makes nonsense ·of. it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious
of what he is doing. So here, 'Alcoa' meant to keep, and did keep
that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with
which it started. That was to 'monopolize' that market, however
innocently it otherwise proceeded. So far as the judgment held
that it was not within §2, it must be' reversed." 29
1912;

The second step• in Judge Hand's argument that Alcoa violated
the Sherman Act was that since it was well settled that all contracts
29
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d)
,4-J 5 at 43 1-43 2. (Italics supplied.)
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fixing prices were prohibited under section I of the act it would be illogical to exempt under section 2 firms having an equal or greate~
degree of control over price. He pointed out that any distinction based
on the argument that the mere existence of the power to control prices
on the part of a monopoly was lawful so long as it was not exercised
was purely formal and disappeared as soon as the monopoly began to
operate, since.the monopoly would then sell at a price fixed by itself.
Likewise, with reference to Alcoa's defense that it was not an unlawful
monopoly because its profits were moderate he pointed out that this
defense had been held irrelevant in the case of price fixing agreements
and that it was equally irrelevant in the case of a monopolistic firm. 80
The foregoing conclusions follow logically from the adoption of the
economic test of monopoly and constitute a tacit recognition of the fact
that the earlier distinction between close-knit combinations and loose
agreements among competitors as regards the application of the Sherman Act was economically and socially indefensible.
A third argument advanced by Judge Hand in support of the view
that Alcoa violated the Sherman Act was that the debates on th.e latter
measure indicated that Congress wished to outlaw monopoly not
merely because of its adverse economic consequences but also because it
preferred the indirect social and moral effects of "a system of small
producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few." 81
In addition to claiming that Alcoa violated the antitrust law because of its control of the ingot market the government also contended
that the company violated the law because of resort to unfair competitive practices, the traditional ground upon which monopolies had
been held in violation of the Sherman Act the past. The government
charged Alcoa with preempting bauxite and water power resources in
excess of its needs, suppressing competitors seeking to invade the ingot
market, manipulating various markets for fabricated goods, conducting
a "price squeeze" in the sheet and cable markets, and entering into
certain unlawful patent agreements.
The district court held that these charges had not been proved and
was sustained by Judge Hand except with respect to the alleged price
squeeze in the aluminum sheet market in 1932. An injunction was

in

so United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927);
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 8II (1940).
31
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. ·(2d)
416 at 427.
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issued against the resumption of this practice, the terms to be fixed by
che district court. The government's complaint against the Aluminum
Goods Manufacturing Company that it joined with Alcoa to dominate
the utensil market was dismissed. Judge Hand explained that although
Alcoa was an unlawful monopoly regardless of the existence of any
unfair practices it was necessary to determine whether the latter existed, and, if so, to enjoin their resumption, because after the war Alcoa
might not be a monopoly but one of a number of competitors.
The court held unlawful the cartel agreement entered into by
Aluminium Limited in 1936, superseding an earlier agreement in 1931,
on the ground that the purpose and e:ffect of the agreement was to
restrict imports of aluminum and therefore to restrain the foreign commerce of the United States. The company was enjoined from entering
into future agreements of this type. However, Alcoa was held not to
have conspired with Aluminium Limited witp respect to these agreements, although the same eleven individuals-A. V. Davis, members
of the Mellon family, and officers and directors of Alcoa-owned 48.9
per cent of the Alcoa stock and 48.5 per cent of Aluminum Lirp.ited.32
A final and extremely important .consideration is the choice of policies to be adopted with respect to Alcoa and the aluminum industry
generally to conform to the decision of the circuit court. Judge Hand
explained that the matter was left undecided for two reasons. First,
whether, or in what manner, Alcoa is to be dissolved should be controlled by the degree of success achieved in establishing a competitive
organization of the industry through the disposal of war-built plants
to others than Alcoa. Judge Hand pointed out that the question of
remedies rests in the first instance with the district court, and that
"there is a peculiar propriety in our saying nothing to control its decision, because the appeal from any judgment which it may enter will
perhaps be justiciable only by the Supreme Court, if there are then
six justices qualified to sit." 83
Second, the Surplus Property Act of I 944 provides that the agencies designated to dispose of surplus property shall be governed by the
objectives of establishing free, independent private enterprise, discouraging monopoly, fostering new enterprises and strengthening the position of small business concerns, and that before negotiating for the
sale of any plant costing over one million dolla:rs the Attorney General
must advise the disposal agency whether the proposed disposition will
violate the antitrust laws. While the district court would not, of course,
82
88

Id. at 440.
Id. at 446.
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be bound by any plan which the disposal agency might evolve for
carrying out these objectives, including the status of Alcoa, the agency
will have the same objectives as the court, "and the court may well
feel that it should accord to the 'agency's' plan that presumptive validity which courts are properly coming more and more to recognize in
the decisions of specialized tribunals." 84
The Attorney General has recommended that Alcoa be dissolved,
but to date no actiou has been taken in this direction.85 Whether or not
it will be dissolved is as yet uncertain, depending as it does so largely
upon the extent to which a competitive organization of the industry can
be developed. As previously indicated, the government cancelled Alcoa's leases of the facilities owned by the Defense Plants Corporation
effective October 3r, r945. Subsequently, on January 9, r946, Alcoa
turned over to the government, royalty-free, its patents for making
alumina from low-grade bauxite. This made feasible the leasing of the
government's alumina plant at Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, the ingot
plants at Jones Mills, Arkansas, and Troutdale, Oregon, and other
facilities, to the Reynolds Metals Company, which thereby became a
fully integrated producing and fabricating organization of considerable
size. Kaiser-Cargo, Inc. has leased the government alumina plant at
Baton Rouge and the ingot plant at Spokane. However, the possibilities of developing competition through the sale of government-owned
facilities are limited by the uneconomical location, excessive size and
high power costs of some of the plants, and by the difficulty which new
firms would have in securing independent supplies of-bauxite.
In any case nothing approaching a regime of pure competition is
feasible in the aluminum industry. Even if it were feasible administratively and otherwise to atomize the industry to a sufficient degree to
attain this objective, very important eco,nomies of integration and
large-scale production would be sacrificed. Competent students are of
the opinion that a large number of firms would be economically justified in the mining and finishing stages of the aluminum industry, but
only a few. in the power, refining and reduction stages, and that there
should be not more than five to ten firms if the full economies of integration and large-scale production are to be realized.56
We turn next to a consideration of the T ohacco case. The so-called
u Id. at 447.
85 Fifth Report of the Attorney General, A Survey Entitled "The Aluminum
Industry/' S. Doc. No. 94, 79th Cong., 1st sess., October II, 1945.
86
PURDY, LINDAHL and CARTER, CoRPORATE CoNcENTRATION AND Pu:eLtc
POLICY 218 (1942).
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"Big Three," American Tobacco Company, Liggett an'.d Myers Tobacco Company, and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, along with
American Suppliers, Inc., a subsidiary of American Tobacco, and certain officials of the foregoing companies, were convicted by a jury in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentu~ky of violating
sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act. Each defendant was convicted
upon four counts: conspiracy in restraint of trade, monopolization, attempt to monopolize and conspiracy to monopolize. No sentence was
imposed under the third count, the court holding that that count was
merged in the second. Fines totalling $255,000 were levied. The conviction was sustained upon appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and by the United States Supreme Court.81 The sole
issue which the Supreme Court agreed to decide was whether actual
exclusion of competitors was necessary to the crime of monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.88 The Court answered this question in the negative and it is important ~o review the facts which led
the Court to this conclusion.89
The Court pointed out, :first, that the present case was completely
independent of the earlier action which led to the dissolution of the
old American Tobacco Trust in 1911 and did not depend upon proof
relating to the old trust but upon dominance and control by the defendants over the purchase of leaf tobacco and sale of cigarettes in re- ,
cent years. It added, however, that the fact 'that the business had remained largely in the hands of the same group of companies for over a
generation "inevitably has contributed to the ease with which control
over competitio~ within the industry and the mobilization of power to
resist new competition can be exercised." 40 The Court spoke of the
existence of a "friendly relationship" and a "community of interest,"
which provided "a natural foundation for working policies and under81 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93 (1944); certiorari
granted, 324 U.S. 836, 65 S. Ct. 864 (1945); petition for rehearing denied, 324 U.S.
65 S. Ct. 864 (1945).
88
A subsidiary contention, which the Supreme Court rejected, was that the
conspiracy count in restraint of trade and the conspiracy count to monopolize trade
amounted to double jeopardy, or a multiplicity of punishment in a single proceeding,
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
89
Justice Burton h~nded down the opinion of the Court. Justices Reed and
Jackson took no part. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, but felt that the
scope of the orders allowing the petition of certiorari should have been enlarged to
permit consideration of alleged errors in regard to the selection of the jury. Justice
Rutledge likewise agreed with the result but ·expressly refrained from passing upon the
question of whether multiple punishment for the same offense was involved.
40
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 at 793, 66 S. Ct. 1125
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~standings'favorable to the insiders and unfavorable to outsiders." 41 It
concluded that "practices of an informal and flexible nature were
adopted and that the results were so uniformly beneficial to the petitioners in protecting their common interests as against those of competitors" that the jury had found a power and intent to exclude
competitors in violation of the Sherman Act.42
The Court next considered the size and market position of the Big
Three. Although the percentage of cigarette production controlled by
the three companies declined over the period 1931-39, as shown in
Table 3, it never fell below 68 per cent. The balance of the production came from six companies, no one of which produced more than the
rn.6 per cent once reached by Brown and Williamson in 1939. If only
burley blend cigarettes, which constitute the special product of the
Big Three, are considered, and the so-called 10-cent cigarettes excluded, the percentage of control enjoyed by the three leaders is increased to 80 in 1939. In the latter year the same companies produced
over 63 per cent of the smoking tobacco and 44 per cent of the chewing
tobacco. On the basis of the foregoing data the Court commented as
follows:
" ... Without adverse criticism of it, comparative size on this
great scale inevitably increased the power of these three to dominate all phases of their industry. 'Size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is
proved to have been utilized in the past.' 43 • • • An intent to use
this power to maintain a monopoly was found by the jury in these
cases." 44
The foregoing statement represents a considerable modification of
the dictum_in the Steel and Harvester cases that mere size is no offense.
It will be noted also that the Court here relied on the Swift case, as dj.d
the circuit court in the Aluminum decision. In the same connection the
Court pointed out the bearing of advertising expenditures on the
maintenance of monopoly. It called attention to the fact that in each of
the years 1937, 1938, and 1939 the Big Three expended a total of
over $40,000,000 a year for advertising, and that such tremendous
advertising expenditure is
"· .. a widely published warning that these companies possess
and know how to use a powerful offensive and defensive weapon
Id. at 793.
Id. at 793.
48 United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106 at u6, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932).
44
Id. at 796.
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TABLE

III

Percentage of Total United States Production of Small Cigarettes
Produced by Leading Companies, 1931-39 •

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

Amer'can Tobacco .......••.......•. 39.5
Liggett and Myers .................. 22.7
R. J. Reynolds ........•.....•...... 28.4
Lorillard ................•.....•.•.•
6.5
Brown and Williamson ...•.•...•...•
0.'2
Philt Morris ....•.....•...•.••....•
0.9
Step ano ............••••.........•
O.I
Axton-Fisher ............•.......•..
0.7
Larus .............................
0.2
Combined percentages of American,
Liggett, and Reynolds ...•.....•..• 9o.7

36.6
23.0
21.8

33.0

26.1
27·4
26.0
4.1
8.3
2.0

24.0
26.0
28.l
3.8
9.6
3.1
1.4

11

5.2.

28.l
22.8
4.7

6.9
I.4
0,1
3.1
1,0

o.8
0.2
4·4
o.6

81.4

83.9

5.5

1937

1938

1939

22.5

21.5

24.6

23.6
28.1
4•7
9.9
5.4

22.7
22.9

22.9
21.6
23.6
5.8
10.6
7.1

1936

29.5

4·4
o.6

3.0
0.7

4·3
9.6
4.1
I.9
2.2
o.8

79.5

78.0

76.7

0.5

2.5

25.3
5.1
9.9

5.7

3.3

l.O

3.1
2.7
1.3

73.3

71.0

68.o

2.4

2.4
1.3

P>

..,....z

~
~

t-l.

~

Source: American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 3:i.8 U.S. 781, 66 S. Ct. u:i.5 at n3:i. (1945) •
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against new ea:ompetition. New competition dare not enter such a
field, unless it be well supported by comparable national advertising. Large inventories of leaf tobacco, and large sums required
for payment of federal taxes in advance of actual sales, fw:ther
emphasize the effectiveness of a well financed monopoly in this
field against potential competitors if there merely exists an intent
to exclude such competitors. Prevention of all potential competition is the natural program for maintaining a monopoly here,
rather than any program of actual exclusion. 'Prevention' is
cheaper and more effective than any amount of 'cure.'" ' 5
Considerable attention was given in the opinion to the practices
followed by the Big Three in the purchase of leaf tobacco. These companies purchased between 50 and 80 per cent of the domestic fluecured toba,cco, between 60 and 80 per cent of the burley crop and "the
greatet part" of the Maryland tobacco." 6 Tobacco crops are perishable,
as they require, a redrying process. The farmers have no facilities for
redrying tobacco and therefrire must sell their crops in the season in
which they are raised or they will lose them. On the other hand, each
of the Big Three held stocks of tobacco with a value of over $ 100,000,000, enough to last about three years, and thus were independent of
the tobacco market in any one year.·
The government presented evidence to show that "although there
was no written or express agreement discovered among American, Liggett, and Reynelds their practices included a clear course of dealing''
.designed to control prices and prevent the intrusion of competit01:;s.'T
Thus the Big Three. were able to control the nllll1ber and location of
tobacco markets by reason of the fact that collectively they purchased
the bulk of the tobacco and the further fact that no one of the Big
Three would participate in a market unless the others were represented.
Attempts by others to open new markets were failures due to absence
of buyers. Foreign purchasers would not participate without the presence of the Big-Three. Nor did tobacco farmers want to sell their tobacco on a market in which the only purchasers were speculators or
dealers desiring to buy tobacco at low prices for resale to manufacturers.
Again, the Big Three instructed their respective buyers concerning
the top pric~ or price range to be bid for leaf tobacco in each market in
advance of the opening of these markets, and these prices appear to
have been uniform for all the buyers. "The petitioners were not so
5

Id. at 797.
Id. at 799.
1
' Id. at 800.

'
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much concerned with the prices they paid for leaf tobacco," said the
Court, "as that each should pay the same price for the same grade and
that none would secure any advantage in purchasing tobacco. They
were all to be on the same basis as far as the expenses of their purchases went." 48 Competition among the buyers was also eliminated
by the device of each company formulating grades of tobacco in which
it alone was interested and for which the other companies would not
compete. The differences in the grades thus formulated, while distinguishable by expert buyers, were said to be inconsequential. Each
of the Big Three determined in advance what portion of the entire crop
it would purchase before the market for that season opened and purchases were spread evenly over the different markets throughout the
season. "No matter what the size of the crop might be," said the Court,
"the petitioners [Big Three] were able to purchase their predetermined percentages thereof within the price limits determined upon by
them, thus indicating a stabilized market." 49
Finally, when lower priced (i.e., IO-cent) cigarettes began to be
sold in substantial quantities, the Big Three commenced to make large
purchases of the cheaper leaf tobacco used for the manufacture of such
lower priced cigarettes. Meanwhile, the composition of the Big Three's
brands calling for the use of more expensive tobacco remained unchanged and no explanation was offered as to how or where the Big
Three used the lower priced tobacco. The government claimed that
these purchases of cheaper tobacco evidenced an intent by the Big
Three to deprive manufacturers of lower-priced cigarettes of the tobacco necessary for. their manufacture, and to raise the price of such
tobacco to a point where cigarettes made therefrom could· not be sold
at a sufficiently low price to compete with the Big Three's advertised
brands.
The trial court also found that the Big Three conspired to fix prices
and to exclude undesired competition in the distribution and sale of
their principal products. The list prices charged and discounts allowed
dealers by these companies remained almost identical between 1923
and the time of the trial and absolutely identical between 1928 and the
latter date. After 1928 only seven changes were made by the three
companies and these were identical in amount. On June 28, 1931, the
list price of Camel cigarettes, the leading brand of Reynolds, was increased from $6.40 to $6.8 5 per thousand, followed the same .day by
identical increases in the price of Lucky Strike and Chesterfield ciga,

48

Id. at 8oz.
49
Id. at 803.
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rettes, the leading brands of American Tobacco and Liggett and Myers, respectively. This increase occurred during a severe depression
when tobacco farmers were receiving the lowest prices for leaf tobacco
since 1905 and when manufacturing costs were declining. Reynolds
justified the action merely as "an expression of confidence in the industry"; American and Liggett and Myers claimed that the increase
would give Reynolds larger funds for advertising and that it was necessary for them to make similar increases in order likewise to increase
their advertising and protect their competitive position.
Prior to 1931 the so-called IO-cent brands of cigarettes enjoyed
relatively small sales, but after the Big Three made the foregoing
increase the sales of the cheaper brands increased rapidly and made
serious inroads on the business of the Big Three. The cheaper brands
sold at a list price of $4. 75 per thousand, and saies of these cigarettes
rose from 0.28 per cent of the· total cigarette sales of the country in
June, 1931 to 22.78 per cent in November, 1932. In response to this
threat the Big Three in January, 1933 cut the list prices of their leading brands from $6.85 per thousand to $6, and the next month to
$5.50. At the latter price American and Reynolds lost money on their
leading brands and Liggett was able to meet expenses only by curtailing normal business activities and by drastically cutting advertising
expense. The Big Three also compelled their dealers to maintain a
di:fferential of not more than three cents per package between the price
· of Camel, Chesterfield, and Lucky Strike cigarettes and the IO-cent
brands. This was accomplished in part by the use of inducements, such
as discounts, advertising displays, cash subsidies and free goods, and
in part by invoking penalties in the form of withdrawing various privileges extended to dealers and by employing price cutters. The price
war resulted in a victory for the Big Three .. Sales of the IO-cent brands
fell from 22.78 per cent of the total cigarette sales in November, 1932
. to 6.43 per cent in May, 1933. In Ja!luary, 1934 the Big Three again
increase4 the list prices of their leading brands from $5.50 to $6.10 per
thousand, to $6.25 in 1937, and to $6.53 in July, 1940.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence the Court summed up its
position as follows:
"The question squarely presented here by the' order of this
Court in allowing the writs of certiorari is whether actual exclusion of _competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization in
these cases under §2 of the Sherman Act. We agree with the lower
courts that such actual exclusion of competitors is not necessary to
that crime in the:se cases and that the instructions given to the jury,

.
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and hereinbefore quoted, correctly defined the crime. A correct
interpretation of the statute and of the authorities makes it the
crime of monopolizing, under §2 of the Sherman Act, for parties,
as in these cases, to combine or conspire to acquire or maintain the
power to exclude competitors from any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, provided
they also have such a power that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competition from the field and provided
that they have the intent and purpose to exercise that power.
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3ro U.S. r50, 223,
n. 59 and authorities cited.... No formal agreement is necessary
to constitute an unlawful conspiracy.... The essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found
in a course of dealing or other circumstances as well as in any ex- ·
change of words. United States v. Schrader's Son, 25r U.S. 85.
Where the circumstances are such as to warrant a jury in finding
that the conspirators had a un_ity of purpose or a common design
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified.
Neither proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of
actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to
srrstain a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act. . . .
The authorities support the view that the material consideration in
determining whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are
raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power
exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to
do so." 50
The decision in the Tobacco case, as suggested earlier, is even more
significant than that in the Aluminum case, in that the Court not only
adopted the economic test of monqpoly but also made it possible effectively to apply the Sherman Act in the case of large-scale ent~rprises exercising varying degrees of market control short of complete
monopoly. Before considering further the implications of the Tobacco
and Aluminum cases, however, it will be desirable to review briefly
the meaning given by economists to the term "monopoly" and "competition." Until recent years monopoly was regarded as the antithesis
of competition. The two were regarded as qualitatively separate and
distinct and the price system was regarded as conforming generally to
this dichotomy. This is _the concept of monopoly implicit 1n the Sherman Act. The framers of this legislation regarded public utilities as
"natural monopolies" while the remainder of industry, with rare ex150

Id. at 808-8 I
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ceptions, was regarded as essentially "competitive." Monopoly was
regarded as exceptional and abnormal in the sphere of "competitive"
industry and the antitrust laws were therefore regarded as a more
appropriate type of control ·in this sphere than direct regulation.
By contrast, modern economic theory regards monopoly as being a
matter of degree, depending upon the number of buyers and sellers of
a commodity and the availability of adequate substitutes. At one extreme is pure monopoly, which may be defined, for practical purposes,
as the exclusive control by a single seller over the supply of a commodity for which there are no close substitutes. 51 Examples of pure
monopoly outside the public utility field are rare, Alcoa's 90 per cent
control of the domestic ingot market prior to I 941 being .a close approximation to this situation. At the opposite extreme, for pure competition to prevail there must be free entry into the trade, a standardized product and a number of buyers and sellers so large that no one
acting independently can affect the price of the commodity sold. The
closest approximation to this situation is found in the markets for a few
agricultural staples, and even here the n~cessary conditions are generally fulfilled only on the seller's side of the market.'
Clearly, pure monopoly and pure competition are exceptions; the
overwhelming majority of all prices are determined under conditions
intermediate between these extremes, reflecting the joint operation of "
monopolistic and competitive influences, both of which are present· in
varying degrees in each case. There is a continuous gradation· in degrees of market control intermediate between the extremes of pure
monopoly and pure competition: This situation is described in modern
economic theory by the terms "oligopoly" and "monopolistic competition." 52 Oligopoly refers to ~ situation in which the sellers of a given
commodity are sufficiently few in number that "it is necessary for each
one to take into account the effect that his own action·s may have on the
behavior of his rivals and to act accordingly." 58 The Tobacco case
provides a good illustration of oligopoly in the sale of cigarettes and
oligopsony in the purchase' of 1leaf tobacco. Without questioning the
government's finding that there was. a conspiracy, it should be pointed
out that many of the practices complained of, as outlined in the pre. ceding pages, are precisely those which the individual firm would adopt
51 The corresponding situation where there is a ~ingle buyer is referred to as
monopsony.
52
The corresponding situations, where th~re are only a few buyers or where each
buyer wants a slightly differentiated product, are referred to as oligopsony and monopsonistic• competition, respectively.
GS Mcls.v.c AND SMITH, l~TRODUCTION TO EcoNOMlC ANALYSIS 48 (1937).
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under conditions of oligopoly or oligopsony if it acted in its own interest independently and without collusion of any sort. A condition of
monopolistic competition exists "when there are many producers of a
certain type of product, and when, at the same time, the substitution of
the product of one firm for that of another is limited by product differentiation." Gt Frequently, as in the Tobacco case, product differentiation is combined with oligopoly or oligopsony. Where one or both
of these situations prevail, price competition is disadvantageous from
the standpoint of the individual firm and there is both opportunity and
incentive to turn competition into non-price channels.
The presence of varying degrees of monopoly introduces both
favorable and unfavorable elements into the price system. On the one
hand, where the economies of large-scale production are substantial
the attainment of producing units of the most advantageous size would
not be possible if the number of firms were large enough to permit pure
competition to prevail. Furthermore, it may be that, within limits,
advertising and product differentiation increase the satisfaction of wants
above what it would be under the standardization required for pure
competition.5 5 On the other hand, monopolistic elements give rise to
earnings above a competitive level, over-investment, underutilization
of investment, undesirable price rigidity and price discrimination, and
product differentiation in excess of what would prevail if consumers
acted rationally and with full knowledge.
The implications of the Aluminum and Tobacco d~cisions may now
be summarized in the light of the foregoing brief analysis of monopoly
and competition. First of all, it should be evident that the problem of
industrial control is very different and vastly more complicated than
it was conceived to be by the framers of the Sherman Act. If monopoly
is defined in the economic sense, an attempt to outlaw all monopoly, as
called for by the Sherman Act, would reach into practically every
market and would be an undertaking of such magnitude as to be administratively impracticable. Moreover, such action would be economically undesirable. As indicated above, in certain aspects and subject to appropriate controls some elements of monopoly may be advantageous. At the same time the ubiquity of monopolistic elements
emphasizes that the public interest requires some type of supervision
or control over virtually the entire price system.
"Id. 47.
65
For a defense of monopoly on still other grounds see Boulding, ''In Defense
of Monopoly," 59 Q.J. of EcoN. 524 (1945). It would take us too far afield to con✓.ider the thesis of this paper here.
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A second implication, which follows from the foregoing, is that
there is need for a revision of the Sherman Act which would redefine
the monopoly and trade practice problem and establish standards or
tests by means of which administrative bodies and courts could distinguish between those market situations and business practices which
are in the public interest and those which are not. If this objective is to
be attained, economists cannot be content with finding evidence of the
existence of market controls and analyzing and classifying the various
types of control situations but must evaluate these situations in terms of
public interest and evolve tests to guide public policy with respect to
them. Stated otherwise, there is need for a new rule of reason based on
more adequate criteria of the public interest than formerly. These criteria should-include not only the protection of the freedom to compete
by suppression of predatory tactics toward competitors and the protection of consumers from exploitation by cutting off monopoly profits but
also the promotion of stabilized, high-level output and employment by
appropriate price and other policies.
Finally, it would seem that some substantial revision of governmental organization and procedure may be necessary if government is
to undertake, and to cope effectively with, the task of economic control
on ~e scale implied by the ubiquity of monopolistic elements in the
industrial organization. The problem will be to prevent the existence
of such far-reaching controls from undermining either efficient administration or the essentials of politiqil democracy, a problem much more
difficult than that of devising economic tests of the conformity of
market organization and practices to the public interest. In view-of the
Aluminum and Tobacco cases the attack on these problems, which the
decisions in the Steel and Harvester cases enabled us to sidestep for a
quarter of a century, can no longer be postponed.

